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Abstract
Corruption is an endemic societal problem with profound implications in the de-
velopment of nations. In combating this issue, cross-national evidence supporting the
effectiveness of the rule of law seems at odds with poorly realized outcomes from reforms
inspired in such literature. This paper provides an explanation for such contradiction.
By taking a computational approach, we develop two methodological novelties into the
empirical study of corruption: (1) generating large within-country variation by means
of simulation (instead of cross-national data pooling), and (2) accounting for interac-
tions between covariates through a spillover network. The latter (the network), seems
responsible for a significant reduction in the effectiveness of the rule of law; especially
among the least developed countries. We also find that effectiveness can be boosted by
improving complementary policy issues that may lie beyond the governance agenda.
Moreover, our simulations suggest that improvements to the rule of law are a necessary
yet not sufficient condition to curve corruption.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, public governance has become one of the main topics in the international
development agenda. However, in spite of significant efforts to improve governance through
the rule of law,1 there seems to be a mismatch between the expectations from policy pre-
scriptions and real-world outcomes.2 In this regard, the World Bank asserts –in its 2017
World Development Report: Governance and the Law– that legal improvements to the rule
of law have rarely succeed in achieving drastic reductions of corruption.3 Baez-Camargo and
Passas (2017) offer a clue and one of the motivations for this study: that the ineffectiveness of
reforms to the rule of law may originate from inconsistencies between the de jure governance
and the social norms that guide citizens and bureaucrats.
This paper studies, theoretically and empirically, a particular avenue for the ineffective-
ness of the rule of law by means of a computational model. Its main contribution is new
evidence of loss in effectiveness due to spillover effects to/from other policy issues. That
is, while isolated improvements to the rule of law should, indeed, generate lower levels of
corruption, such outcome is poorly realized because, in the real world, 1) the ceteris paribus
conditions for other policy issues do not hold and 2) co-movements in other topics introduce
effects that may oppose the traditional conduits of anti-corruption policies (i.e., inverting the
net benefit of misbehaving and curtailing the discretionary use of resources). For example,
positive externalities to policy issue i induce a new incentive structure in which the official
in charge of i has more opportunities to divert funds because its inflated performance (due
to the externalitites) looks positive under imperfect supervision.
Considering a non-ceteris paribus setting with spillover effects allows us to move beyond
1The Oxford Dictionary defines rule of law as “the restriction of the arbitrary exercise of power by
subordinating it to well-defined and established laws”.
2These expectations were formed, to certain extent, by results from cross-national regression studies where
the rule of law appeared, persistently, as one of the policy instruments with significant negative associations
to aggregate corruption.
3Corruption is defined by the Oxford Dictionary as the “dishonest or fraudulent conduct by those in
power, typically involving bribery”. Another popular definition used by organizations such as Transparency
International, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program is “the misuse of public office
for private gain”.
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the principal-agent framework and consider collective action mechanisms as a source of cor-
ruption. The latter has long been advocated for by several scholars in governance and public
administration. Thus, we propose a new theoretical framework that can be illuminating
for empirical studies of corruption and the discovery of abatement policies. In particular,
we shed new light on the relationship between the rule of law and corruption through four
types of hypotheses: (I) loss of effectiveness, (II) policy profile, (III) complementarity and
(IV) priority. The loss-of-effectiveness hypotheses assess if improvements to the rule of law
become ineffective under non-ceteris-paribus conditions where spillovers are present. Policy
profile hypotheses evaluate the presence of such impact when reforms to the rule of law are
part of a larger policy package. The complementarity hypotheses test if policy issues with
a negative association to corruption exhibit stronger effects when linked to the rule of law
via spillovers. Finally, the priority hypotheses check if policy profiles that reduce corruption
necessarily imply prioritizing the rule of law over other policy issues.
We produce country-level estimates from 115 countries during a sample period of 11 years
and test these hypotheses. Our main findings consist of (I) evidence of a reduction in the
effectiveness of the rule of law due to spillover effects; (II) a negative association between
the rule of law and corruption not only in isolation, but as part of larger policy profiles; (III)
that complementary policy issues with spillovers to/from the rule of law have significantly
larger associations to corruption than those without; and (IV) that effective policy profiles
do not translate into increasing the priority for the rule of law over other topics. The rest of
the paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 provides a review of the literature.
Section 3 introduces the data, the theoretical model and the empirical strategy. In section
4, we present the empirical findings with regard to hypotheses family I. Section 5 shows the
results related to hypotheses families II, III and IV. Finally, we provide our conclusions in
section 6.
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2 On the study of corruption and the rule of law
2.1 Principal-agent versus collective action
Broadly speaking, the empirical literature on the determinants of corruption tends to agree
on the statistical significance of the rule of law (hereby called RoL), when tested in a cross-
sectional setting. At the same time, however, there is substantial disappointment among
international organizations with regard to the poor performance of institutional reforms in-
spired in such literature (Bank, 2017, pp. 77-79). We argue that such discrepancy originates
from a view that focuses exclusively in the principal-agent problem (Rose-Ackerman, 1975;
Klitgaard, 1988). From such perspective, corruption arises from the presence of asymmetric
information between the agents (i.e., public servants or elected officials) and a principal (i.e.,
government or voters) whose monitoring efforts are imperfect. Consequently, improvements
to the RoL should reduce the agents’ expected net benefits from diverting funds and curtail
opportunities for the discretionary use of public resources.4
One of the problems with the principal-agent-only view is that systemic properties of
corruption are considered irrelevant. This has been pointed out by Persson et al. (2013),
who argue for collective action as an account for corruption. In their view, the principal-agent
model is ill-suited for explaining corruption because, in many developing countries, there are
no principals willing to align the agents’ interests with long-term societal welfare. Therefore,
in countries without such principals, the expectation of corrupt behavior is widespread,
reinforcing incentives to act in such manner. That is, when an individual believes that
many others are corrupt, s/he does not have incentives to act differently. It is important
to clarify that, in this scenario, dishonest behavior is not provoked by a lack of morality,
but by a collective memory (or common knowledge) where high levels of corruption are
4This scenario occurs when the enforcement of the law increases the probability of catching offenders
and when reforms to the RoL –and other governance mechanisms– reduce the space for an unaccountable
management of public funds. Broadly speaking, incentives for proper behavior are elicited through political
competition, while rent-seeking opportunities are diminished by fostering economic competition (Ades and
Tella, 1997).
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socially tolerable. Because there is a generalized presumption that this is how society works,
corruption becomes a collective-action problem.
In this paper, we intertwine the principal-agent and the collective-action perspectives.
Our theory highlights two systemic features of corruption that are present in most nations:
(1) an adaptive government that establishes policy priorities (resource allocations) across
several policymaking offices; and (2) a spillover (positive externality) network among these
policy issues (e.g. health, education, infrastructure, public governance, etc.). From this
perspective, we argue that corruption is the consequence of a political economy process
through which the principal adapts to an uncertain environment, while agents learn to col-
lectively establish social norms (corruption norms). Formally, we model such process as a
game on a network. In this game, there is an information problem but, in contrast with
the principal-agent view, this has to do with the uncertainty generated by the spillovers.
Hence, the misalignment of incentives between government and bureaucrats gives place to a
decentralized learning process.
2.2 Econometric studies
The econometric literature on the determinants of corruption is extensive and shows consen-
sus with respect to the statistical significance of the RoL. The theory proposed in this paper
aligns with this consensus in several ways, but differs in others. In particular, considering
the interactions between different policy issues is not standard in these studies. Further-
more, due to data limitations, country-specific policy prescriptions are difficult to infer from
traditional econometric frameworks. In this section, we review some seminal studies and
elaborate on ways in which a computational approach could complement them.
Early studies on the determinants of corruption exploit the cross-national variation of
different development indicators through pooled-regressions (Ades and Tella, 1997; Leite and
Weidmann, 1999; La Porta et al., 1999; Treisman, 2000; Broadman and Recanatini, 2001;
Dollar et al., 2001; Paldam, 2002; Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Herzfeld and Weiss, 2003; Brunetti
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and Weder, 2003; Knack and Azfar, 2003). Overall, these studies have been consistent with
the idea that governance instruments are effective tools that can be used in the fight against
corruption. As the econometric literature has progressed, more sophisticated approaches
have been deployed in order to overcome some of the limitations in these seminal works and
provide a more fine-grained picture of the relevant policy tools.
In studies using Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA),5 Gnimassoun and Massil (2016) and
Jetter and Parmeter (2018) find that some policy variables are robust predictors and, thus,
they can be utilized by governments for abating corruption in relatively short periods. Some
of these predictors include quality of education, female participation in parliament, willingness
to delegate authority, freedom of the press, burden of regulation, absence of political rights,
property rights and rule of law (at least in one of the statistical analyses presented). It is
important to emphasize that institutional covariates have a prominent role in this set of
explanatory variables.
Jetter and Parmeter (2018) apply a variant of the BMA to consider endogeneity in a
large set of independent variables, instrumented through their one-decade lagged values.
They find that, out of 32 potential determinants of corruption across 123 countries, 10 are
robust. Furthermore, they identify five determinants with direct policy instruments: years
of primary education, trade freedom, rule of law, federal system, absence of political rights.
Note that the last three are associated to the country’s governance framework. Consistent
with most cross-sectional studies, the level of economic development (GDP per capita) is
also significant.6
5BMA is employed to deal with model uncertainty. A different approach, however, has been proposed by
Serra (2006) via Extreme Bound Analysis. Here, a predictor is considered robust when it remains statistically
significant and preserves the same sign in all models that include such a variable. A less restrictive criterion
for a predictor to be defined as robust is that the zero value is not included in the averaged 90% confidence
interval of the estimated coefficients (Seldadyo and de Haan, 2006). The reader should be aware that this
method is prone to multicollinearity problems due to potential interdependencies among the determinants.
Hence, some auxiliary technique is required to cope with this issue.
6When causality is considered, years of primary education and GDP per capita become the two most
relevant factors, while the RoL is still robust but less prominent. An alternative methodology that deals
with reverse causality and heterskedasticity is three-stage least squares, as done by Croix and Delavallade
(2011).
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Using quantile regression in order to deal with parameter heterogeneity, Billger and Goel
(2009) identify that improvements in democracy have a negative effect on corruption only
among the 50% most-corrupt nations. On the other hand, increments in government size have
negligible effects among the most corrupt countries. In an alternative strategy, Gnimassoun
and Massil (2016) and Jetter and Parmeter (2018) split the sample by geographical region
and development status, respectively. The latter authors, for example, find that the RoL
is prominent among developing countries (i.e., non-members of the OECD), implying that
the effectiveness of legal accountability diminishes once the quality of the RoL has reached
certain level.7 In this sub-sample, only two of the 11 robust predictors relate to governance
(RoL and absence of political rights) while two more are associated to some policy instrument
(foreign direct investment and government size).
In spite of these commendable efforts, there are still empirical challenges that need to
be addressed; some related to the course-grained nature of development-indicator data, and
others to methodological issues that are inherent to the econometric study of aggregate rela-
tionships. Regarding data, development indicators, generally, do not allow the exploitation
of within-country variation (unless an extremely narrow set of covariates is used). While
cross-national variation is, then, the dominant factor, its results have a limited policy in-
terpretations since the estimated coefficients correspond to a hypothetical country with the
average characteristics of the sample. Another data issue comes from the Rodrik critique
(Rodrik, 2012) which points out that policy indicators are not independent random vari-
ables, but conscious and strategic decisions made by governments in an attempt to obtain
specific goals. Thus, the choice of development indicators as exogenous variables might not
7On one hand, several cross-country studies find a significant RoL coefficient (Ades and Tella, 1997; Leite
and Weidmann, 1999; Broadman and Recanatini, 2001; Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Herzfeld and Weiss, 2003;
Ali and Isse, 2002; Park, 2003; Damania et al., 2004; Croix and Delavallade, 2011; Iwasaki and Suzuki, 2012;
de Mendonc¸a and da Fonseca, 2012; Elbahnasawy and Revier, 2012). On the other, others find significant
coefficients among alternative governance indicators; some related to current policies (e.g., government ef-
fectiveness, decentralization, freedom of the press, federal system, women in parliament, etc.) and others
associated to the origins of the legal system. For extensive reviews on corruption and their economic, insti-
tutional and historical determinants (Jain, 2001; Lambsdorff, 2016; Pellegrini, 2011); (Seldadyo, 2008, Ch. 5);
Dimant and Tosato (2018)
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be appropriate.
The main methodological limitation comes from the Lucas critique, rejecting the as-
sumption that, under regression analysis, the estimated effects during the sample period
will still be valid in an out-of-sample evaluation.8 For example, given previous evidence on
parameter heterogeneity across income groups, a country’s estimates are likely to shift as its
economy develops. Hence, in order to try to overcome some of these challenges, we propose
a computational approach.
2.3 Proposed empirical approach
In this paper, we take a computational approach and argue that agent-computing can help
overcoming problems of reverse causality, non-linearity, parameter homogeneity, the Lucas
critique and policy endogeneity. To show this, we employ a computational model of the
policymaking process, that allows producing country-specific estimates of the effectiveness
of the RoL in reducing the diversion of public funds.
Micro-founded computational models have the ability of producing generative causality
(Epstein, 2006); something that we exploit to estimate the effectiveness of the RoL via
controlled experiments. Generative causality means that the micro-level social mechanisms
from our theory of corruption are formally specified in an algorithm, acting as the data-
generating process. Through these experiments, we study the incidence that exogenous
government decisions have on the aggregate level of corruption. In addition, this approach
allows considering the endogenous variation of other policy issues that affect or are affected
by the RoL, facilitating the estimation of a loss in effectiveness due to spillovers (something
not doable under a ceteris paribus assumption). Finally, since the algorithmic nature of the
model allows specifications at the micro and macro levels, it can deal with the problem of
8In the neoclassical view, it is commonly argued that only ‘deep’ parameters (i.e., associated to technology
or preferences) can be invariant. Hence, the associated prescription has to be estimated though micro-
founded functional relationships. However, several authors have pointed out that such prescriptions are
built on a flawed diagnostic on how complex societies operate (see Colander and Kupers (2014) for more on
this criticism).
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parameter instability under counterfactuals (Castan˜eda and Guerrero, 2018).9
3 Data and method
3.1 Data
We build a dataset with 79 development indicators for 115 countries. Broadly speaking, the
indicators can be categorized into 13 development pillars that roughly correspond to the
pillars of the World Economic Forum.10 We combine indicators from various sources such
as the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, the World Development
Indicators, and the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI); the last two produced by the
World Bank. Each indicator has been normalized in the range [0,1], and adjusted so that
higher indices reflect better outcomes.
The 13 development pillars covered by the 79 indicators are the following: governance of
firms, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health, education, goods market efficiency,
labor market efficiency, financial market development, technological readiness, business so-
phistication, R&D innovation, public governance and cost of doing business. From the 8
indicators belonging to the pillar of public governance, two are especially relevant to our
model: control of corruption and rule of law. Both of them belong to the WGI database.
These indicators reflect the perception of citizens, entrepreneurs and experts in the public,
9Recently, general equilibrium models have been developed to deal with interdependencies between en-
dogenous (e.g., economic development and corruption) and exogenous variables (e.g., quality of governance).
Here, inference comes from theorems (e.g., Blackburn et al. (2006, 2011)), regression estimates testing the-
oretical propositions (e.g., Croix and Delavallade (2011); Haque and Kneller (2009); Aidt et al. (2008)) or
simulations (e.g., Dzhumashev (2014); Barreto (2000)). Although, this approach is explicit about the causal
channels between governance structure and corruption, it also has several drawbacks. First, the outcomes
and mechanisms from equilibrium models are not properly validated with empirical evidence. Second, in
the associated regressions, governance factors such as the RoL are assumed to be exogenous instead of
endogenous variables; neglecting important processes such as learning and collective action. Third, many
equilibrium models that produce solutions through simulations have too many parameters, often calibrated
through questionable criteria (e.g., by adopting parameter values used by another author in a study of a
different country).
10We choose this classification over alternative ones (e.g., Sustainable Development Goals or World De-
velopment Indicators) because it contains more explicit governance instruments than the others.
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private and NGO sectors. Although perception-based indices have well-known limitations,
they are still one of the best metrics used in corruption studies. As defined by the WGI,
control of corruption “captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised
for private gain”. We use this indicator as a proxy of the quality of the monitoring efforts by
the central authority. On the other hand, the indicator of rule of law captures “perceptions
of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society”.11 This
is our main independent variable.
In order to facilitate the presentation of our results (not for estimation purposes), we di-
vide the sample into four clusters. These clusters are obtained through the Ward’s clustering
method, which minimizes the similarities between development indicators within clusters and
maximizes the differences between members of different clusters. Roughly speaking, the four
clusters match the World Bank’s income groups: (1) high, (2) middle-high, (3) middle-low
and (4) low. However, in contrast with standard income classifications, clustering algorithms
take into account the overall structure of countries’ development indicators. The sampling
period is 2006-2016, and the countries included in each cluster are specified in Appendix A.
3.2 The model
In order to overcome the limitations of regression-based studies and to combine the principal-
agent and the collective-action views, we employ a computational model of the social mech-
anisms that act as the process that generates of corruption and development (Castan˜eda
et al., 2018). Originally, such model was created to estimate government priorities from
development-indicator data by simulating the resource-allocation process across multiple
policy issues. Through an exogenous spillover network, it takes into account the poten-
tial incentive structure that, according to our theory, may arise from positive externalities.
Therefore, it can also be used to examine the loss in effectiveness of the RoL derived form
11Note that the World Economic Forum provides an indicator for the diversion of public funds. We have
excluded this variable from the sample as it corresponds directly to the definition of corruption used in the
proposed model. Thus, this variable has been used to calibrate the model parameters as in done in Castan˜eda
et al. (2018).
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the proposed theoretical mechanisms.
The model consists of a political economy game where the central authority (the princi-
pal) sets policy priorities in terms of resource allocations, while public servants (the agents)
are in charge of implementing such policies. The agents may use the allocated resources
towards the policies that will transform their corresponding development indicators, or they
may divert part of these resources for a personal gain. These decisions are shaped by the
spillovers, the monitoring mechanism of the principal, the quality of the RoL and the prof-
itability of corruption according to the social norm. Consequently, aggregate corruption is
an endogenous variable. In this section, we present an overview of the equations that are
directly connected to RoL intervention.
In a typical simulation, the model begins with a vector I of initial values for different
development indicators of a given country. Then, the government tries to transform them by
increasing their levels until reaching a target vector T . Every period, the central authority
determines a vector of policy priorities P (the allocation profile), such that
∑N
i Pi,t = B
for every period t and a budget constrain B. Each entry Pi,t corresponds to the resources
allocated to policy issue i. These resources are given to a bureaucrat with the mandate of
transforming the development indicator corresponding to policy issue i. It is here, during
the implementation phase, where corruption in the form of diverted public funds takes place.
This leads to the first ingredient of the model, the public servant’s benefit function
Fi,t = (Ii,t + Pi,t − Ci,t)(1− θi,tfR,t). (1)
Equation 1 captures the ‘incentive effect’ associated to an enhancement in the quality
of the RoL. On the one hand, a bureaucrat receives political status from good indicator
performance (Ii,t). On the other, s/he also benefits from extracting a private rent by diverting
funds through a lower contribution Ci,t towards the policy issue. However, her/his benefits
are dampened if s/he is caught diverting funds. Thus, θi,t is a binary variable representing the
random event of being caught. Here, randomness means that the monitoring mechanisms of
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the central authority are imperfect. However, the likelihood of successful outcomes is linked
to the quality of such mechanisms and to the endogenous social norm of corruption, which
we explain below. Finally, fR,t ∈ [0, 1] captures the quality of the RoL. The intuition is that
a higher fR,t translates into less impunity and larger punishments.
As mentioned above, the probability of catching corruption depends on the quality of
monitoring fC,t ∈ [0, 1] and a social norm. More specifically, if official i diverts a dispropor-
tionately large amount of resources, s/he will stand out and will likely be exposed by society,
for example, through a media scandal. Therefore, the probability of θi,t = 1 is given by
fC,t
(Pi,t − Ci,t)∑N
j=1(Pj,t − Cj,t)
, (2)
The terms fR,t and fC,t are endogenously determined by the evolution of the correspond-
ing indicators of rule of law (x = R) and control of corruption (x = c) through the link
function Ix,t/(exp 1− Ix,t). This marks an important departure from previous approaches:
the quality of the RoL is endogenous. That is, exogenous government decisions to change
the RoL may come from setting a new target Ti for its quality, however, the evolution of
the indicator is endogenous. Thus, changes to the RoL indicator are rather the consequence
of modifications in the government’s objectives and, then, generated by the model through
specific channels. This allows estimating the effectiveness of the RoL while accounting for
potential parameter shifts, interdependencies with other indicators and inefficiencies arising
from the policymaking process.
Together, the agents’ contributions and the spillover network drive the evolution of the
indicators. We specify this process through
Ii,t = Ii,t−1 + γ(Ti − Ii,t−1)
∑
j
Cj,tAji, (3)
where Aji is the adjacency matrix representing the spillover network as a weighted directed
graph with ones in the diagonal. Parameter γ represents the overall quality of public policies
12
in a country takes the values estimated by Castan˜eda et al. (2018).
As we show ahead, equation 1 is subject to different sources of uncertainty. For this rea-
son, modeling the officials’ decisions as a rational optimization problem is ill-suited. Instead,
we opt for a simpler and more realistic behavioral model: directed learning. The intuition
of this approach is straightforward: if Fi,t > Fi,t−1 then the bureaucrat i reinforces her/his
previous action (diverting more or less funds), otherwise s/he changes the level of her/his
contributions in the opposite direction to that of the previous period (see Appendix B for
the corresponding equations).
The first and most obvious source of uncertainty in the bureaucrat’s benefit function
is the stochastic element of the principal’s monitoring efforts. The second is the evolution
of the associated indicator. This is so because an indicator’s growth also depends on the
spillovers coming from the contributions of other officials. The third source is the change of
priority Pi that the central authority assigns to policy issue i. Such change originates from
the government’s behavior, which we model as an adaptive process.
The government determines its allocation vector through
Pi,t = B
qi,t∑
i qi,t
, (4)
where qi,t is the propensity to prioritize policy issue i in period t, and is given by
qi,t = (Ti − Ii,t)(Ki + 1)(1− θi,tfR,t), (5)
where Ki is the out-degree of policy issue i (the number of non-zero entries in row i of A)
and represents a proxy that the government uses to rank policy issues according to their
socioeconomic importance (how central the issue is in the country’s context).
Equation 5 shows how government actions generate changes in allocations and, hence,
uncertainty to the officials. First, conditional on Ki, the government prioritizes the most
laggard policy issues. Therefore, as specific topics progress, government allocations shift to
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other issues. Second, the term 1−θi,tfR,t means that the government readjusts its allocation
whenever it discovers corruption. The magnitude of such reallocation depends on the quality
of the RoL. Therefore, we can say that, through the ‘allocative effect’ improvements to the
RoL can diminish the government’s propensity to allocate funds to highly corrupt officials.
Putting the pieces together, we can say that a RoL intervention starts at the level of one
of the targets, representing the government’s exogenous intentions (e.g., an increase in Ti,
where i corresponds to the RoL). Then, it trickles throughout the system via three channels:
(1) an ‘incentive effect’ that modifies the trade-off in the agent’s benefit function; (2) an
‘allocative effect’ that modifies the opportunities for wrongdoing; and (3) a ‘spillover effect’
that boosts the agent’s political status by improving its indicator. While the incentive and
opportunity effects fit well into the principal-agent view of corruption, the spillover effect is
a systemic property that coincides with the collective-action view. Arguably, it is possible to
generate theoretical explanations where these three effects work in opposite directions. For
this reason, it is important that evaluations of RoL-related policies account for the specific
context faced by each country.
Overall, for a given country, the model takes as inputs the initial and final values of the
development indicators. The former are the country’s initial conditions and the latter its
targets. For this study, we use the country-specific spillover networks estimated in Castan˜eda
et al. (2018). The model simulates the dynamics of the indicators until they reach their
targets. Then, for a single simulation, we obtain the temporal evolution of the amount of
diverted funds Pi − Ci. We elaborate on the specific metrics in the following sections.
3.3 Simulated interventions
Instead of exploiting the cross-national variation corresponding to the indicators of RoL
and corruption, our strategy consists of using the model to endogenously generate different
within-country levels of corruption by exogenously varying the target TR (not the indicator)
of the RoL. There are several reasons why the targets are better exogenous variables than
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indicators. First, development goals (or targets) often come from various processes that are
not necessarily related to policy implementation (at least not as strongly as indicators), for
example, campaign promises, international agreements, political consensus, societal pressures
or even discretionary decisions. In contrast, empirical development indicators originate from
the policymaking process (which involves inefficiencies such as corruption), so they are likely
conflated across topics and with the dependent variable. Second, when providing a policy
prescription from econometric studies, it is assumed that a change in indicators equates to
a similar change in policy priorities. This is unlikely to be the case since policy priorities
are endogenous variables from the policymaking process. At the same time, other effects
such as spillovers may be driving the indicators’ dynamics. Third, increasing targets does
not imply a proportional effect in corruption (a common assumption in linear models that
use indicators). Thus, using them as the exogenous variables allows us to account for the
potential non-linearities and bottlenecks coming from the data-generating mechanism.
We divide the empirical analysis in two groups. The first (presented in section 4 and
containing hypotheses from family I) focuses on the exogenous modification of the target of
the RoL (TR). That is, we study its effect in isolation from all other targets. Note, how-
ever, that this procedure does not imply a ceteris paribus assumption for the indicators and
allocations of all other issues.12 In the second group (presented in section 5 and containing
hypotheses from families II, III and IV), we investigate corruption when varying the entire
target vector. This has an intuitive interpretation in terms of countries adopting compre-
hensive policy profiles such as the ones prescribed by multilateral organizations. Hence, we
explore potential complementarities between the RoL and other policy issues.
12For a given country, a retrospective simulation consists of running the model from its initial conditions
until the indicators reach the target vector T . Here, we assume that the targets are the empirical final
values of the indicators. A counterfactual simulation, on the other hand, can be performed by modifying
specific targets such as TR. Then, we run a simulation with a TR larger than the one from the retrospective
estimation. Given that the only varying factor between both types of simulations is TR, we can assert that
the resulting difference in corruption is caused by a change in the government’s objective with respect to the
quality of RoL.
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3.4 Aggregate corruption
At this point, it is important to clarify that a simulation period t does not correspond to
time. Instead, it represents the occurrence of events such as the reallocation of resources
or the punishment of corruption. For this reason, inter-period metrics provide information
about the frequency with which certain events occur during the time span of the dataset.
Thus, our measure of aggregate corruption consists of the sum of all events of diversion of
public funds throughout the simulation, averaged across all policy issues. More specifically,
we quantify corruption as
D =
1
B
∑
i
∑
t
(Pi,t − Ci,t). (6)
This measure of corruption has two components: (1) the aggregate level of diverted
public funds per event and (2) the frequency with which these events take place. The
first component reflects the nominal dimension of this form of inefficiency, while the second
captures its commonality through time. Due to the dual nature of this metric, enhancements
to the RoL have static and dynamic effects. The former appears, for instance, when the
incentive effect encourages public servants to divert less. The latter takes place when the
allocative effect shrinks the size of the pie among corrupt officials but, at the same time,
may increase the number of periods needed to reach the targets because there is less budget
to transform the affected indicator. Due to this static-dynamic dichotomy, one would not
necessarily expect less corruption from improvements to the RoL, at least not in a linear
fashion.
We can summarize the estimation of aggregate corruption as follows:
1. Given initial conditions and targets T , run the model until Ii,t ≈ Ii,t−1 for every i.
2. Compute D through equation 6.
3. Repeat the 1 and 2 to collect a Monte Carlo sample (1000 simulations) of D.
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4. Compute the average D¯ from the Monte Carlo sample.
We obtain S estimates {D¯1, . . . , D¯S}, corresponding to the expected aggregate corruption
for different sets of Monte Carlo simulations. For each set of simulations, we determine a
different level for the target TR corresponding to the RoL. More specifically, we determine
an increasing sequence of uniformly spaced targets {TR1 , . . . , TRS} such that TR1 corresponds
to the empirical one and TRS = 1 which is the maximum value in the sample. Therefore,
the estimates {D¯1, . . . , D¯S} reflect the level of corruption generated by different degrees of
improvement of the RoL with respect to the retrospective estimation.
An outcome that is consistent with the econometric literature should produce a negative
relationship between TR and D¯. However, should a non-linear relationship emerge, it would
be the result of the micro-level data-generating process rather than the aggregate association
between two variables: an endogenous variable (corruption) and a poorly conceived exoge-
nous variable (RoL). Furthermore, the various effects previously explained can also give raise
to a null relationship or even a positive one (but we would expect few). In addition, these
estimates do not require pooling cross-national data, so any inference for policy purposes is
based on the country’s own experience.
3.5 Loss of effectiveness
In colloquial terms, effectiveness is understood as the reduction of corruption caused by
improvements to the quality of the RoL. In econometric analyses, this is the interpretation
of the coefficient corresponding to the RoL. More generally, let f(TR) be a function describing
the relationship between TR and D¯. Then, we can define the effectiveness of the RoL as
∆f
∆TR
.
Let g(TR) represent another relationship between TR and D¯; this time derived from a
counterfactual analysis: omitting spillover effects. Then, the differences between ∆f
∆TR
and
∆g
∆TR
can give us an idea of the change in effectiveness of the RoL due to differences between
the estimated and counterfactual worlds. These differences, however, might vary depending
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on the level of TR (especially in the presence non-linearities). Thus, we propose the following
metric for the loss of effectiveness:
L = 1−
∫
TR
g(TR)dTR − [g(TR1)− f(TR1)]∫
TR
f(TR)dTR
, (7)
where subtracting g(TR1)− f(TR1) allows controlling for nominal discrepancies in the levels
of corruption (e.g., f(TR) < g(TR) by virtue of the accelerated convergence to targets caused
by the spillovers between indicators).13
L measures the area between the normalized versions of f(TR) and g(TR). Figure 1
provides a hypothetical example in which removing the spillovers generates a stronger TR−D¯
relationship. Then, the shaded area between both lines denotes the loss in effectiveness
generated through a systemic component: the decentralized formation of corruption norms.
Figure 1: Example of loss of effectiveness due to spillover effects
target for the quality of the RoL (TR)
co
rru
pt
io
n 
(D
)
with spillovers f(TR)
without spillovers g(TR)
loss in effectiveness
Relationships f(TR) and g(TR) are estimated through splines that interpolate values
in the intervals {D¯1, . . . , D¯S} produced by the exogenous variation of TR. This method
facilitates an analytic computation of L (discrete approximations yield similar results). In
total, we specify S = 31 (30 alternative values in addition to the initial estimation) for each
13Confidence intervals can be obtained by repeating the entire procedure to compute D¯ and then L.
However, at the time we write this paper, this approach may be computationally prohibitive for large samples
of countries and indicators. Therefore, we construct bootstrap confidence intervals by resampling the Monte
Carlo ensemble {D1, . . . , Dn}i corresponding to each level of TRi and computing D¯. After computing the re-
sampled D¯ for all target levels in both specifications (with and without spillovers), we compute L. Repeating
this procedure generates the bootstrap sample L, which we then use to obtain the index intervals.
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country.
3.6 Hypotheses
Finally, and before proceeding to present our results, let us be more specific about the hy-
potheses to be tested. As we mentioned in section 1, we evaluate four families of hypotheses.
3.6.1 Loss of effectiveness
These are the main hypotheses of the paper. They provide evidence of a never-before mea-
sured effect caused by a systemic feature of corruption.
Hypothesis I.a Spillovers cause a loss in effectiveness of the RoL
Hypothesis I.b Losses in effectiveness of the RoL due to spillovers vary across countries
3.6.2 Policy profile
These hypotheses take us beyond the current academic discussion of the RoL and corruption
in order to shed some light on the potential outcomes of simultaneously implementing diverse
policy prescriptions.
Hypothesis II.a Policy profiles that improve the RoL have a negative association with cor-
ruption
Hypothesis II.b The general improvement of policy profiles has a negative association with
corruption
3.6.3 Complementarity
This hypothesis allows us to understand how, through spillovers, parallel prescriptions can
boost reductions in corruption. These results can be extremely useful for rethinking policy
evaluation and prescription in a systemic fashion.
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Hypothesis III Policy issues with a negative association to corruption exhibit a stronger
relationship when they have spillovers to/from the RoL, i.e. they are complementary in
abating the diversion of public funds.
3.6.4 Priority
This set of hypotheses explores prescriptions packages associated to reductions in corruption.
More specifically, they seek to answer: do effective prescriptions imply prioritizing the RoL
over other topics?
Hypothesis IV.a Reductions in corruption through improvements to the RoL are associated
to higher relative target priorities
Hypothesis IV.b Reductions in corruption through improvements to the RoL are associated
to higher relative allocative priorities
4 Results 1: exogenous reform of the rule of law
Besides testing the specific hypotheses from family I, our first group of results allow us to
examine two broader and important questions about the public governance agenda: (1) for
which type of countries do reforms to the RoL are most effective in curtailing corruption?;
and (2) which countries experience heavier losses of effectiveness due to spillovers between
public policies?
4.1 Effectiveness of the rule of law
For the purpose of a visual comparison, we have grouped our estimations into the four
clusters and normalized the horizontal axis so that TR1 = 0 and TRS = 1. This facilitates
the visual comparison of the TR − D¯ relationship across countries with very different initial
conditions (i.e., controlling for the variation in the initial level of the RoL). Figure 2 shows
the TR − D¯ relationship for each country in the sample.
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Figure 2: Corruption as a function of the rule of law target
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Each line corresponds to the estimated effect of the RoL on corruption in a particular country.
Each line was obtained from a polynomial spline interpolation of the intervals {TR1 . . . TRS}.
For a visual comparison of their ‘slopes’, all the splines have been vertically shifted to start
with the same level of corruption. With the same purpose, the values in the horizontal axis
have been normalized between 0 and 1. Clusters: (1) high, (2) middle-high, (3) middle-low
and (4) low income.
Figure 2 shows several distinctive results. First, the RoL has a negative effect on cor-
ruption across many countries from clusters 2–4, and in very few from cluster 1 (the most
advanced ones). This is consistent with the econometric literature, where the negative slope
is mainly determined by the influence of developing countries. Second, in all clusters, there
are several countries for which the RoL is not effective (the spline is flat); although, this
phenomenon is more commonly observed in clusters 1 and 2. A tentative explanation is that
more advanced nations have less room of improvement for the RoL, so the lack of variation
in {TR1 . . . TRS} generates weaker TR − D¯ relationships.14 Third, even if the incidence is
14An alternative is that the principal-agent mechanisms dominate in these countries because effective
monitoring and low impunity disincentivize corruption through frequent punishments and reductions of
opportunities for diversions through effective reallocations. Under this view, it would not be surprising if
the principal-agent-only view was majorly motivated from the experience of developed economies.
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negative, it can be highly non-linear. Fourth, there are very few cases where the relationship
is positive. Presumably, in these cases, the incentive effect is very small and substantially
masked by the spillovers, so that the negative relationship disappears. At the same time,
the allocative effect precludes assigning resources to policy issues that need them the most
(i.e. with the largest target gaps) which, in turn, produces a larger number of corruption
events.
As an exercise to confirm general results obtained in previous studies, let us estimate the
relationship f(TR) for each country via linear regression. That is, we estimate the model
D¯ = α + βTR + . If the β coefficient results negative and significant in most countries, it
means that our model generates data that is consistent with the empirical literature. Out of
115 countries in the sample, 79 (69%) present a negative β coefficient. Interestingly, and also
consistent with previous findings, a negative and significant association between corruption
and the RoL exists mainly in developing countries, not among the industrialized nations.
For instance, in cluster 1, countries with a negative and significant β represent only 23%; in
cluster 2 they are 68%; in clusters 3 they are 92%; and cluster 4 has 88%. We provide a more
detailed picture across countries in Figure 3, where nations have been sorted by income per
capita. Clearly, the less developed a country is (orange and dark-red dots), the better the
chances to reduce corruption via improvements to the RoL.15 These results confirm, too, our
scepticism on modelling frameworks that assume parameter homogeneity across countries.
4.2 Loss of effectiveness
We have argued that the mismatch between optimistic predictions and poor outcomes from
improvements to the RoL can be explained by a generalized indifference toward the systemic
features of corruption. Here, we focus on one such feature –spillovers– and provide novel
estimates on the TR − D¯ relationship that suggest a loss of effectiveness of the RoL.
For a qualitative comparison, Figure 4 contrasts the estimations from Figure 2 (the left
15Note that there are some country-cases where the estimated average relationship is positive, specially
for advanced nations.
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Figure 3: Effectiveness of the RoL
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β coefficients estimated via OLS for the model D¯ = α+βTR + . Countries in the horizontal
axis have been sorted according to income per capita. The vertical lines correspond to 95%
confidence intervals (wider intervals show similar results).
panels of each cluster) against the ones obtained by removing the spillover network (the
right ones; here A is an identity matrix). Just from eyeballing the plots, it is clear that the
negative incidence of the RoL on aggregate corruption becomes stronger without spillovers.
This suggests that the systemic feature of spillover effects dampens the effectiveness of the
RoL. Note that, without spillovers, almost all countries present a negative relationship and
that, only after introducing a network, we obtain that the countries where the RoL can be
effective are the developing ones. Qualitatively, this outcome is similar to the one obtained
when moving from pooled to stratified regressions. However, we have achieved this through a
micro-funded model, allowing us to produce country-level estimates. Furthermore, country-
level losses in effectiveness are consistent with the poorly-realized real-world outcomes from
reforms to the RoL experienced by governments and multilateral organizations.
Now, let us look in more detail at the changes in the TR − D¯ relationship caused by
the spillover network. For this, we consider six countries from the least-developed clusters
2–4; two per each cluster.16 Furthermore each pair of countries within a cluster shares
a geographical border. Hence, within-pair differences would make a strong case for the
importance of context-specificity. Figure 5 shows each country with its corresponding spline
16These are the clusters where improvements to the RoL tend to be more effective in reducing corruption.
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Figure 4: Change in the TR − D¯ relation from spillover effects
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Splines of the TR−D¯ relation by cluster and model specification (with and without spillovers).
For each cluster, the left panel shows the splines estimated for the model without spillover
effects, while the right panel corresponds to the splines from Figure 2
with and without spillovers. As we can see, countries from cluster 2 exhibit sharp differences
in the loss of effectiveness. In fact, the RoL becomes relatively ineffective in Colombia, while
in Panama –despite the spillovers– it continues to be a useful policy instrument. The case
of Ukraine, in cluster 3, exhibits a slight gain in efficiency for small improvements to the
RoL but, after certain point, it shows losses. This country demonstrates how spillovers can
generate strong non-linearities. In contrast, its neighbor Georgia shows a linear relation
through most values of TR, and an increasing loss in effectiveness. Finally, the pair from
cluster 4 shows a well behaved case (Zambia) and a degenerate one (Malawi). In the latter,
for all the range of TR, there are gains in efficiency from the spillovers. Although this case
is an outlier, it is useful to illustrate that it is possible to observe unlikely outcomes.17
In order to test hypotheses I.a and I.b, we compute the L-index introduced in equation
7. Recall that a positive index denotes a loss in effectiveness of the RoL, while a negative
one indicates gains. In support of hypothesis I.a, we find that the loss in effectiveness is
17Note: (1) a positive relationship TR− D¯, even when controlling for systemic factors (increasing segment
of the dashed-curve); and (2) incentive and allocative effects that impact corruption in the same direction
as the systemic factors (decreasing segments of the curves).
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Figure 5: Examples of ‘similar’ countries with different losses in the effectiveness of the RoL
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Two countries from cluster 2, 3 and 4 have been chosen for illustrative purposes. Each pair
consists of neighboring nations.
statistically significant in the majority of the countries (77% of the sample). When looking
at the cross-national variation, we find that only 64% of cluster 1 experience a significant loss,
but these represent 89% in cluster 2, 63% in cluster 3 and 83% in cluster 4. Such a striking
difference in loss of effectiveness between developed and developing countries highlights the
importance of the context-specific systemic features of corruption and supports hypothesis
I.b. Figure 6 provides a detailed picture of these findings.
Combining the results from Figures 3 and 6, we conclude that (1) there are several
countries from cluster 4 where reforms to the RoL are effective; (2) their impact could be
significantly strengthened through strategies that consider systemic factors; (3) for some
countries in clusters 2 and 3, the RoL will not be effective unless systemic elements are
considered; (4) for some countries in clusters 1 and 2, reforms to the RoL will not be able
to abate aggregate corruption. These results coincide with the observed failure in the im-
plementation of the governance agenda in many developing countries. Clearly, any attempt
to avoid this loss in effectiveness would require profiles of coordinated policies that exploit
the systemic nature of corruption.
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Figure 6: Country-level index of the loss of effectiveness to the RoL
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A positive index denotes loss of effectiveness while a negative value signifies a gain. The
vertical lines denote the 95% bootstrap confidence interval (wider intervals show similar
results).
5 Results 2: multidimensional policy profiles
So far, we have studied the effect that isolated changes to the target of the RoL have on cor-
ruption. These changes, however, are rarely observed in the real world. This is so because,
when governments set development strategies, they establish simultaneous reforms across
different dimensions. Take, for instance, the example of a government receiving advise from
experts on different areas (e.g., macroeconomic policy, public health, telecommunications,
etc.). By collecting such recommendations, multidimensional policy profiles are assembled
and, eventually, policy priorities established. Thus, it is natural to hypothesize whether the
systemic features of corruption play a role in the effectiveness of the RoL as part of a policy
profile. For example, if the topology of the spillover network facilitates complementarities
between the RoL and other policy issues, one would expect a stronger incidence on corrup-
tion. It follows, thus, that it is important to understand the role of the RoL under different
policy profiles.
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5.1 Policy profiles and the rule of law
First, we are interested in testing the association between improvements in policy profiles and
corruption. We do it by testing hypotheses II.a and II.b. For this, it is necessary to introduce
exogenous variation not only in TR but in the entire target vector T . More specifically, for
each policy issue i, Ti is created by randomly sampling the interval (Ii,n, 1) under a uniform
distribution (where n is the last period in the sample). In this way, we generate random
uncorrelated policy profiles that prescribe improvements across all policy issues.
For illustration purposes, let us consider the six country cases presented in Figure 1. Each
panel in Figure 7 shows the relationship between TR and D¯ through 1000 different policy
profiles. Visually, all countries seem to present a negative relationship between the target of
the RoL and diversion of public funds, suggesting a negative association between the RoL
and aggregate corruption, unconditional on policy profile. This association, however, varies
from country to country. For example Georgia appears to have the weakest association while
Colombia or Malawi the strongest.18
Table 1: Average correlation between TR and D¯
Statistic Pooled Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
mean Spearman (TR) -0.31 -0.01 -0.3 -0.47 -0.46
mean p-value (TR) 0.03 0.18 0.0 0.0 0.0
negative & significant (%) 88.7 36.36 97.78 100.0 100.0
mean Spearman (T¯ ) 0.08 0.2 0.08 0.0 0.03
mean p-value (T¯ ) 0.17 0.0 0.15 0.0 0.21
negative & significant (%) 2.61 0.0 0.0 4.17 4.17
N 115 22 45 24 24
N indicates the number of countries included in the analysis. Statistical significance is at
95% (wider intervals show similar results).
In order to test hypotheses II.a and II.b, we compute the Spearman correlation between
18Note that the empirical level of corruption seems to be lower than the one generated through random
policy profiles. This result is expected since all random profiles present targets above the observed levels
and, hence, reaching them requires more corruption events.
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Figure 7: The RoL and corruption across policy profiles
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Two countries from cluster 2, 3 and 4 have been chosen for illustrative purposes. Each pair
consists of neighboring nations. Each policy profile was generated by sampling target levels
Ti ∼ U(Ii,n, 1).
TR and D¯ for each country. The first three rows in Table 1 show the average correlation and
mean p-values for the entire sample and by cluster. In addition, they show the percentage
of countries in each group that have a negative and significant correlation. Clearly, these
results support hypothesis II.a on a negative association between the RoL and aggregate
corruption across policy profiles.
The role of the RoL in reducing corruption through policy profiles becomes clearer when
testing hypothesis II.b. For this, we calculate the average value T¯ of the entire target vector
and its correlation with D¯. The intuition behind this exercise is to verify if improvements
to arbitrarily chosen issues also reduce corruption or if they need to be accompanied by
improvements to the RoL. The bottom set of rows in Table 1 present strikingly different
results from the top one. Clearly, they do not support hypothesis II.b and suggest that the
RoL plays an important role regardless of the proposed policy profile. In a way, we can think
of these results in the following way: in order to curve corruption, improvements to the RoL
seem to be necessary but not sufficient.
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5.2 Complementarities for abating of corruption
We have established the necessity of improving the RoL in order to fight corruption. At the
same time, we have argued that, by itself, the RoL is insufficient to substantially ameliorate
the problem. Thus, a natural follow-up question is whether there are other policy issues
that can serve as complements to the RoL. Such complements could be extremely helpful to
design better-articulated policy profiles.
Given the theory and the model presented in this paper, it make sense to look for com-
plementary policy issues in the spillover network. Here, we can think about complementar-
ities in two different ways. First, the presence of incoming links to the RoL implies that
contributions to connected policy issues will help dampening corruption through indirect
improvements in the quality of the law. Second, the existence of outgoing links from the
RoL implies that enhancements in this indicator will produce spillover effects, reduce target
gaps and, then, diminish the frequency of corruption. In order to evaluate these ideas, we
test hypothesis III, which states that, from all the policy issues with a negative association
to aggregate corruption, those that share links to/from the RoL have a stronger association.
In order to test this, we use the simulated data on policy profiles to estimate the model
D¯ = β1T1 + · · ·+ βNTN +  (8)
for each country. Note that, by construction, the independent variables are uncorrelated and
their observations are independent because they are produced from separate simulations.
Hence, having such a large number of covariates does not produce multicolinearity.
The β coefficients approximate the association between each indicator and D¯. For a given
country, we isolate those coefficients that are negative and significant (with a p-value ≤ 0.1).
Then, we separate them into those with a connection to the indicator of the RoL (incoming
or outgoing) and those without it. Finally, we test whether the group of covariates with
links have β coefficients significantly different from those without.
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In order to fulfill the assumptions of a statistical test for related samples, we restrict the
dataset to those countries that have at least one negative and significant coefficient with a
link to the RoL and at least one without. We also remove the coefficient corresponding to
control of corruption because its corresponding indicator has an explicit effect in the model
through equation 2, which would bias the results in favor of hypothesis III. For each country
in the reduced sample, we compute the average β¯ =
∑n
i |βi|/n in each group (the groups
being: with and without link). Finally, we pair the β¯ between groups by country (e.g.,
Colombian β¯ with link versus Colombian β¯ without link).
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics from the sub-sample and the outcomes of
non-parametric mean-equality tests for related samples. Note that the average β coefficient
is always higher among policy issues with links to the RoL than among those without them,
supporting hypothesis III. This is robust even after dividing the sample into clusters. The
results from the Wilcoxon sign-rank tests confirm that these differences are statistically
significant.
Table 2: Test for differences between having and not having links to the RoL
Statistic Pooled Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
µ(β¯) link 1.15 3.17 0.98 0.13 0.27
σ(β¯) link 1.85 2.9 1.12 0.03 0.18
µ(β¯) no link 0.2 0.6 0.12 0.08 0.07
σ(β¯) no link 0.33 0.59 0.05 0.03 0.05
N 30 6 14 6 4
W -statistic 9773.0 426.0 1414.0 1435.0 69.0
p-value 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
The W -statistic corresponds to the Wilcoxon sign-rank test for related samples. The differ-
ences between paired observations are not normally distributed, so this method is preferred
over the t-test.
As an additional exercise, we illustrate how the set of complementary policy issues with
spillover effects is country-specific. For this, consider the 13 development pillars, and their
corresponding policy issues. Taking only the negative and significant β coefficients that have
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links to the RoL, we construct the total β coefficient of development pillar j as
∑
c
∑
i∈Pj |βi,c|,
where the outer sum runs across countries in a specific cluster and the inner across policy
issues belonging to pillar j. The reason to take a sum instead of an average is to account for
the fact that some policy issues are complementary to the RoL in some countries but not in
others, so if an issue appears more frequently across countries, it becomes more important.
Hence, this exercise is mainly illustrative and has the purpose of facilitating a comparison
between development pillars.
Figure 8 shows treemap plots for the pooled dataset and for each of the clusters.19 In
general, the composition of complementary topics is strikingly different. For instance, im-
provements to public governance are considerably more complementary to the RoL in less
developed countries. In contrast, reducing the cost of doing business seem to be more useful
in high and middle-high income countries (clusters 1 and 2). This confirms the importance
of producing country-specific estimates in order to build bespoke policy profiles.
Figure 8: Total β coefficients for policy issues with links to the RoL
pooled cluster 1 cluster 2 cluster 3 cluster 4
 governance of firms
 infrastructure
 macroeconomic environment
 health
 education
 goods market efficiency
 labor market efficiency
 financial market development
 technological readiness
 business sophistication
 R&D innovation
 public governance
 cost of doing business
5.3 Effective policy profiles
Our last set of results explores whether policy profiles that successfully reduce corruption
tend to prioritize the RoL relative to other policy issues. We can think of such prioritization
19When performing the same procedure to negative-significant beta coefficients without links to the RoL,
the composition of complementary policy issues looks rather homogeneous across clusters (see appendix C).
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in two ways: (1) priority in terms of goals through T and (2) priority in terms of allocated
resources through P . For this we test hypotheses IV.a and IV.b.
First, we generate target vectors T ′ under which D¯ is lower than the empirically esti-
mated under the retrospective analysis.20. Second, in order to evaluate relative priorities, we
calculate the rank QT that the RoL has in the empirical target vector T (1 being the highest
entry in T and 79 the lowest). Then, the difference QT −Q′T represents the relative change in
the priority that the RoL receives among the targets (a positive sign means an improvement
in the ranking). Alternatively, QP − Q′P denotes the relative change in priority in terms
of the allocated resources. We employ these two metrics to test hypotheses IV.a and IV.b
respectively. A positive correlation between D¯−D¯′ and QT −Q′T would suggest that, among
the policy profiles that effectively dampen corruption, larger reductions are associated to
higher relative priorities to the RoL target, supporting hypothesis IV.a. This, however, is
not the case. We find that the Spearman correlation between these metrics is -0.01 with a p-
value of 0.73. Similarly, it is -0.062 with a p-value of 0.04 for allocative priorities. Therefore,
our results do not support any of the hypotheses from family V.
Figure 9 summarizes these results by presenting a scatter plot combining target and
allocative changes in priorities. The main take-away is that effective anti-corruption pre-
scriptions that encourage improvements to the RoL do not imply a higher prioritization of
this topic over other policy issues. In fact, a complete set of priorities can only be derived
through a systemic view of the problem. Thus, overemphasizing the RoL and turning it into
the most important agenda could become a misleading endeavour.21
20Since the space of possible target vectors is too large, we employ a heuristic optimization algorithm
called differential evolution (Storn and Price, 1997). For a given country, the algorithm runs until it finds
a T ′ such that D¯ drops by 25% with respect to the empirical level. Then, for that country, we recover all
those vectors that also produced reductions in D¯ during the optimization process.
21Paradoxically, a country positioned in the negative quadrant can become more efficient with the proper
policy profile, even if its RoL priorities (in targets and allocations) are reduced with respect to the empirical
ones.
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Figure 9: Relative changes in the priority of the RoL
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The color of the dots corresponds to the cluster identification: blue for 1, green for 2, orange
for 3 and maroon for 4.
6 Conclusions
Our results suggest that a rule-of-law heavily-oriented governance agenda, by itself, will
hardly achieve the desired low-corruption outcomes. In particular, isolated reforms to the
rule of law (inspired solely on a principal-agent view) that reshape incentives and restrain op-
portunities for discretionary expenses are likely to be ineffective, especially in the developing
countries. In our view, this is a consequence of neglecting the systemic features of corrup-
tion such as spillovers between public policies and social norms that evolve in an uncertain
environment. Therefore, in order for policy profiles to be truly effective, it is important to
embed some type of coordinating device that can guide the system towards low-corruption
norms. In such profiles, special importance should be given to policy issues that lie beyond
the governance agenda and that could be complementary in the abatement of corruption.
Our computational approach allows producing country-specific estimates on the effective-
ness of the RoL under different settings in relation to other covariates. Simulation outcomes
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support the importance of country-specific context and, thus, advocate for policy prescrip-
tions that are tailored to satisfy the particular and distinct needs of each government. In
such prescriptions, improvements to the RoL are necessary but not substitutes of improve-
ments in other policy issues. That is, prescriptions that emphasize improvements to the RoL
should be careful of not over-prioritizing this topic (at least not if the objective is reduc-
ing corruption). Clearly, the complexity of this problem and the instruments to tackle it
require alternative methods than can deal with systemic attributes. Such tools can enable
the discovery of counter-intuitive explanations and the production of ex-ante evaluations to
analyze the effectiveness of alternative policy tools.
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A Countries and clusters
Table 3 provides a list of all the countries that are included in each cluster. Countries are
identified through their International Organization for Standarization code (alpha-3).
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Table 3: List of countries by cluster
Cluster Number of countries Countries
1) High 24 ARE AUS AUT BEL CAN CHE DEU DNK FIN
FRA GBR HKG IRL ISR JPN KOR MYS NLD
NOR NZL QAT SGP SWE USA
2) Mid-high 45 BHR BRA BWA CHL CHN COL CRI CZE EGY
ESP EST GRC GTM HND HRV HUN IDN IND
ITA JAM JOR KWT LKA LTU LVA MAR MEX
MUS NAM OMN PAN PER PHL POL PRT SAU
SLV SVK SVN THA TTO TUN TUR URY ZAF
3) Mid-low 24 ALB ARG ARM AZE BGD BGR BIH BOL DOM
DZA ECU GEO KAZ KGZ MKD MNG NIC NPL
PRY RUS SRB TJK UKR VEN
4) Low 24 BDI BEN BFA CIV CMR ETH GHA GMB KEN
KHM MDG MLI MOZ MRT MWI NGA PAK SEN
TCD TZA UGA VNM ZMB ZWE
B Co-evolutionary learning
In this appendix, we present the equations modeling the public functionaries’ learning pro-
cess. This variant of reinforcement learning helps them to determine her/his levels of con-
tribution to the investment in policy issue i
Ci,t = min
{
Pi,t,max
(
0, Ci,t−1 + di,t|∆Fi,t|Ci,t−1 + Ci,t−2
2
)}
, (9)
where ∆Fi,t is the most recent change in benefits and di,t is the sign function
di,t = sgn(∆Fi,t ·∆Ci,t), (10)
such that
∆Fi,t = Fi,t−1 − Fi,t−2
∆Ci,t = Ci,t−1 − Ci,t−2.
(11)
That is, through direct signals obtained from their gains and losses of benefits with
respect to the previous period, these bureaucrats learn to maintain or reverse a trend in
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contribution changes. In other words, they keep the direction of the change when observing
an increase in benefits, and modify it when observing a reduction.
C Treemap plots for non-complementary policy issues
Note that, in Figure 10, a wide diversity of policy issues with no links to RoL exhibit
a negative impact on corruption. However, there is not a notorious heterogeneity in the
magnitude of these impacts across clusters.
Figure 10: Total β coefficients for policy issues without links to the RoL
pooled cluster 1 cluster 2 cluster 3 cluster 4
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